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I. INTRODUCTION 
Gill v. Gill1 should have been a standard case about classifying, valuing, 
and distributing marital property during a marriage dissolution. Instead, Gill 
developed into an authoritative case that usurped legislative authority and 
created new precedent. Creating new precedent was unnecessary because 
there was ample discretion provided in the governing statutes to obtain a just 
and equitable distribution.2 Further, the new precedent is undesirable 
because it takes away the flexibility and certainty of the governing statutes, 
while proliferating gender and role-based disparities that the legislature has 
purposefully tried to eliminate.3  
A. Factual Background 
Stephen Gill (“Stephen”) and Gretchen Gill (“Gretchen”) were 
married in 1993.4 During their marriage, the couple decided the optimal 
course for their family was for Stephen to pursue his career while Gretchen 
focused her efforts on raising the couple’s children and providing 
background support to her husband while he developed and increased his 
earning capacity.5 This arrangement worked well for the couple. With 
Gretchen’s support, Stephen was able to acquire Talenti, a Gelato 
company.6 Under his leadership, the company thrived and became a 
multimillion-dollar asset.7  
                                                           
*Wendy Cicotte is a second-year student in Mitchell Hamline's Executive J.D. program, 
anticipating graduation in May 2022. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Brigham 
Young University-Idaho. She is working to become an advocate for policies supporting 
traditional families and the free exercise of religion. 
1 919 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 2018). 
2 MINN. STAT. §§ 518.003, 518.58 (2019); see also infra Section IV.D.4. 
3 See infra Part II. 
4 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298.  
5 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and 
Decree at 8, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 
2016). 
6 Id. at 4. 
7 Id. at 10. 
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After nearly twenty-one years of marriage, Stephen filed for a marital 
dissolution in August 2014.8 Pursuant to Minnesota statute,9 the Gills’ 
ownership in Talenti was classified as marital property and valued at their 
marriage dissolution’s valuation date.10 However, shortly after the valuation, 
but before the Gill’s dissolution was final, the company sold for a $180 
million up-front payment with two subsequent earn-out payments that 
would be calculated on future growth.11 The sale amount was significantly 
more than the company’s valuation just two months prior.12  
Gretchen petitioned the court to classify the proceeds from the sale of 
Talenti, including the earn-out payments, as marital property and award her 
an equitable portion.13 To address the situation, the Gill court had to 
determine whether the proceeds from Talenti’s sale were marital or 
nonmarital property, and if so, whether the earn-out payments were part of 
the proceeds.14 
The district court applied the law rigidly and held the sale occurred 
after the valuation date, so proceeds were not marital property.15 The court 
further stated, in dictum, that “earn-outs, if obtained, will be a result of 
Husband’s significant post-marital labor and should be awarded to him as 
nonmarital property.”16  
Gretchen appealed the district court’s decision to the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals.17 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
award based on contract interpretation, holding that “the purchase 
agreement unambiguously provided that the purchaser of [Talenti] was 
willing to pay $180 million, plus two earn-out payments . . . regardless of 
                                                           
8 Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 300. 
9 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019) (“The court shall value marital assets for purposes 
of division between the parties as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement 
conference.”). 
10 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 309 (valuing Talenti at $180 million). 
11 Id. at 298. 
12 Compare id. (valuing Talenti at $180 million at valuation date), with id. at 309 (stating sale 
price after valuation date, but before dissolution, as a $180 million up-front payment with 
two potential future earn-out payments that could range from $0 to $170 million in value).  
13 Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
14 Id.; see also Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301.  
15 MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3(b) (2019) (“‘Nonmarital property’ means property real 
or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage, 
which . . . (d) is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date . . . .”); Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 
301.  
16 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and 
Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 
2016). 
17 See Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717.  
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whether a seller continued work for the purchaser. Because the earn-outs 
payments were part of the purchase price for [Talenti], they reflect 
[Talenti’s] value as of the [valuation date].”18  
Stephen appealed the decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court.19 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
holding that “because the parties’ interest in the company was marital 
property that was acquired before the valuation date, the consideration for 
the sale of the company, which occurred before the dissolution and 
included an amount paid at the time of the sale and a contractual right to 
receive future amounts, is also marital property.”20  
However, the dissent in Gill rightly pointed out that the majority, in 
reaching its decision to classify earn-out payments as marital property, 
required “considerable legal gymnastics which include[d] disregarding the 
district court’s factual findings, ignoring the valuation date, [and] rewriting 
the statutory definition of ‘marital property.’”21  
B. Summary of Analysis 
Minnesota’s law governing property distribution in a marriage 
dissolution was purposely crafted to eliminate gender bias and generate 
certainty through an established valuation date while still affording a high 
degree of flexibility to render a just and equitable distribution through 
judicial discretion.22 The new precedent ignores the legislature’s purposeful 
balancing and instead adopts a new inflexible rule: that all proceeds from 
the sale of marital property before dissolution constitute marital property as 
a matter of law.23  
This note analyzes in detail the challenges caused by Gill. Challenges 
include: (1) equitable distribution requires discretion which the statute 
provides and Gill takes away; (2) Gill’s attempt at a strict rule creates 
uncertainty; (3) new precedent was unnecessary because a just and equitable 
outcome could have been accomplished within the confines of the existing 
law; (4) Gill proliferates the power imbalance that often accompanies a 
traditional marital relationship where one spouse, traditionally the wife, 
gives up her earning potential to stay home and raise the couple’s children 
                                                           
18 Id. at 719.  
19 See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301.  
20 Id. at 298. 
21 Id. at 308 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
22 MINN. Stat. §§ 518.003, 518.58 (2019); see also infra Part II. 
23 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298; see also id. at 308 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
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and support her husband; and (5) Gill facilitates post-Gill planning for 
distribution of marital assets that game the system.24  
This case note begins with a history of the statutes and cases that 
regulate how Minnesota classifies and divides property in a marriage 
dissolution.25 This is followed by the facts of Gill v. Gill and an in-depth 
procedural history.26 Ultimately, this case note posits that in all the stages of 
litigation, none of the courts reached a fully reasoned conclusion within the 
confines of the law on the valuation of marital property.27  
As a result, in deciding Gill, the Minnesota Supreme Court created 
new precedent that could engender unfair property distribution in the future 
because it does not allow judicial discretion and instead reinforces negative 
gender stereotypes that may create unfairness in the dissolution of 
traditional marriages.28  
II. HISTORY 
A. Just and Equitable Property Distribution 
Minnesota—like most states—adheres to the concept of equitable 
distribution.29 As early as 1951, section 518 of the Minnesota statutes 
regulated how marital property should be classified and divided in a 
marriage dissolution to achieve equitable distribution.30 
Initially, the statute gave the court absolute discretion to make a 
“disposition” of property that was “just and equitable.”31 The statute listed 
six discretionary factors for consideration by the court when making the 
disposition, but many of the factors had a focus that favored the 
                                                           
24 See infra Section IV.E.–F. 
25 See MINN. STAT. § 518.003 (2019); see also MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (2019). 
26 See infra Part III. 
27 See infra Part IV. 
28 See infra Section IV.F. 
29 Compare Equitable Distribution, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The 
division of marital property by a court in a divorce proceeding, under statutory guidelines 
that provide for a fair, but not necessarily equal, allocation of the property between the 
spouses.”) with Community Property, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Assets 
owned in common by husband and wife as a result of their having been acquired during the 
marriage by means other than an inheritance by, or a gift or devise to, one spouse, each 
spouse generally holding a one-half interest in the property. Only nine states have 
community-property systems: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. A community-property regime is elective in Alaska.”). 
30 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1951). 
31 Id. (“Upon a divorce for any cause . . . the court may make such disposition of the property 
of the parties acquired during coverture as shall appear just and equitable.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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breadwinner’s financial contributions and were often to the homemaker’s 
detriment.32 Generally, during this period, the breadwinner was a man, and 
the homemaker was most often a woman. The statute also contained explicit 
gender discrimination through continued use of the centuries-old term 
“coverture.”33 Under coverture, a married man and a woman were treated 
by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity.34 
Additionally, there was implicit discrimination throughout the statute 
because it did not explicitly eliminate discrimination by referencing both 
spouses or including additional factors to safeguard against society’s 
traditional expectation that the woman gives up career and financial 
opportunity to stay home and care for the home and family.35 For example, 
property disposition depended on how it was acquired.36 In this period, 
property would most often be acquired solely from the husband’s earnings 
because the majority of married women were not in the workforce.37 
Likewise, the court was urged to look at who was paying or supplying the 
consideration for the property.38 Again, the husband was most likely to be 
the spouse paying or supplying the consideration for the property due to the 
traditional roles spouses held in society at this time.39  
                                                           
32 Id. (limiting the court’s discretion to six factors: (1) a regard to the nature and determination 
of the issues in the case; (2) the amount of alimony or support money; (3) the manner by 
which said property was acquired; (4) the persons paying or supplying the consideration for 
the property; (5) the charges or liens imposed upon the property to secure payment of 
alimony or support money; and (6) all the facts and circumstances of the case). 
33 Id. (“Upon a divorce for any cause, or upon an annulment, the court may make such 
disposition of the property of the parties acquired during coverture as shall appear just and 
equitable . . . .”).  
34 Id.; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *430 
(1765). 
35 Compare MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1978) (adding language applying discretionary factors to 
“each party” and “each spouse”), with MINN. STAT. § 518.58, Sec. 5 (1951) (containing no 
language that shows application of the discretionary factors to both spouses or parties).  
36 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1951). 
37 Changes in Women’s Labor Force Participation in the 20th Century, BLS.GOV (Feb. 16, 
2000), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2000/feb/wk3/art03.htm [https://perma.cc/4WPL-
HSFG] (showing about one in three women participated in the labor force in 1950, and of 
those, a greater percentage were women age 16 to 24). 
38 MINN. STAT. §518.58, sec. 5 (1951) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 
(2019)). 
39 Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with 
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts, and Dissociation under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 70 
(1993) (“Startling inequities have resulted, as judges ignore the realities of scant property and 
limited earning potential and adopt the legislative assumption that homemakers need 
minimal, if any, maintenance.”). 
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In the ensuing twenty-five years, the legislature recognized the statute’s 
discrimination and unfair prejudice and slowly began the process of 
eliminating bias by updating key terminology and adding language to 
accomplish its goal of obtaining a just and equitable result.40 In 1978, the 
legislature replaced “coverture” with “marriage” and replaced the 
discretionary language—“may make . . . disposition of the property . . . as 
shall appear just and equitable,”—with the explicit language that the court 
“shall . . . make a just and equitable disposition of the marital property.”41  
Nonetheless, even with the explicit instruction to make a just and 
equitable disposition, the legislature still allowed the court considerable 
discretion in how to implement its intent.42 There were still concrete 
discretionary factors to consider, though the list was significantly changed to 
eliminate favoritism for the breadwinner and create a way to fairly assess the 
needs of both spouses with gender-neutral factors.43 For example, two new 
factors—age and health—applied equally to both spouses and genders. The 
additional factors of employability and vocational skills look to counter the 
homemaker’s sacrifice, regardless of whether the homemaker is a man or a 
woman.44  
The new assessment was a charge to consider “all relevant factors,” but 
the new list was by no means exhaustive.45 The court’s latitude of discretion 
even extended to an award of up to one-half of the nonmarital property 
based on extreme hardship.46  
                                                           
40 Id. Starnes advocates divorce law reform as “an immediate response that will both ease 
current suffering and encourage future relaxation of gender roles.” Id. at 9.  
41 Compare MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1951), with MINN. STAT. §518.58 (1978) 
(emphasis added). 
42 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1978). 
43 Id. (replacing the factors from 1951 with sixteen gender neutral factors: (1) the length of 
the marriage; (2) any prior marriages of a party; (3) age; (4) health; (5) station; (6) occupation; 
(7) amount and sources of income; (8) vocational skills; (9) employability; (10) estate; (11) 
liabilities; (12) needs; (13) opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets; (14) amount of 
support, maintenance and income of each party; (15) whether the property award is in lieu 
of or in addition to maintenance or support; (16) the contribution, or dissipation of each 
spouse in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation in value of the respective 
estates; and (17) the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker). 
44 See Starnes, supra note 39, at 119 (“The ‘ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal 
partnerships between spouses who share resources, responsibilities, and risksʼ and thus 
perhaps some limited duty to sacrifice for the good of the partnership.”). 
45 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1978) (“The court shall base its findings on all relevant 
factors including [all the factors listed in supra note 43].”) (emphasis added). 
46 Id. (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019)) (“If the court finds that 
either spouse’s resources or property, including his portion of the marital property . . . are 
so inadequate as to work an extreme hardship, the court may, in addition to the marital 
7
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B. Just and Equitable Property Distribution for All 
Most importantly, the 1978 amendment acknowledged the significant 
contributions a homemaker brings to a marriage by openly charging the 
court to consider the “contribution of a spouse as a homemaker”47 and 
mandating a presumption “that each spouse made a substantial contribution 
to the acquisition of income and property while they were living together as 
husband and wife.”48 This mandated consideration evinced an increased 
awareness that many marriages share all property and income while focusing 
the wife’s efforts on maintaining the home and family and building the 
husband’s career and earning power.49 The legislature and the court 
recognized that marriages are dependent on several components, only one 
of which is financial.50 Therefore, a spouse’s contribution could no longer 
be measured solely by the amount of money he or she contributed; 
nonfinancial components also needed to be measured to facilitate just and 
equitable property division.51  
Fine-tuning of the statute continued in 1979 when the legislature 
changed the primary consideration for awarding nonmarital property from 
one of “extreme hardship” to a consideration of “unfair hardship” and 
added an examination of “all relevant circumstances” in doing so.52 In 1982, 
the legislature returned to the homemaker provision and added one word—
“conclusively.”53 The statute now read, “It shall be conclusively presumed 
that each spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of 
income and property while they were living together as husband and wife.”54 
This one-word addition heightened the importance of the homemaker’s 
role from one that presumed the homemaker had a high probability of 
                                                           
property, apportion up to one-half of the property otherwise excluded [as nonmarital 
property] . . . to prevent the hardship.”). 
47 Id. (“The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of each in the acquisition, 
preservation, depreciation or appreciation in value of the respective estates, as well as the 
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.”). 
48 Id. 
49 See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences 
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981) (discussing 
California’s no-fault divorce law and the major shifts in legal processes of divorce). 
50 See Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing that the increase 
in the value of a business acquired prior to the marriage is due to the efforts of both spouses, 
including the wife’s nonfinancial contributions to the home life that allowed the husband to 
focus on growing the family business).  
51 Id. 
52 MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1979). 
53 MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982). 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
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making a substantial contribution to a conclusive presumption that “cannot 
be overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted 
as irrefutable proof that establishes the fact beyond dispute.”55 Moreover, 
the addition solidified the legislature’s intent to make a just and equitable 
distribution by financially protecting the homemaker who had sacrificed his 
or her own income and earning potential for the greater good of the family. 
This alleviated some of the pressures a financially vulnerable homemaker 
might feel to seek a financial safety net by abandoning the vital homemaker 
role and entering the workforce.56 
Finally, throughout the statute, the legislature changed the word 
“disposition” to “division.”57 “Disposition of property” references property 
owned by one individual that is transferred to another,58 while “division of 
property” references property that is owned together and subsequently 
divided among the owners.59 This momentous change reinforced the 
legislature’s “conclusive presumption that each spouse made a substantial 
contribution to the acquisition of income and property while they were living 
together as husband and wife,” regardless of whether one spouse was a 
homemaker who did not, during the period of the marriage, utilize his or 
her earning potential.60 Marital property was no longer the breadwinner’s to 
be transferred as the court deemed fair. Instead, marital property was 
property that rightfully belonged to both spouses based on their distinct, yet 
equally valuable, contributions to the marriage.61 
                                                           
55 Conclusive presumption, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
56 See Starnes, supra note 39, at 69, stating: 
Wifely submission is risky business . . . . Gone is the day when a wife could 
depend on her husband’s labor to maintain her at home, ‘secure and safe.ʼ 
Today is the day of divorce at will and equality rhetoric, which means that if her 
marriage ends, the homemaking wife will be catapulted into financial 
independence, and probably financial ruin. 
57 MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982). 
58 Disposition, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
59 Equitable Division, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“With equitable 
distribution, when a marriage ends in divorce, property acquired during the marriage is 
divided equitably between the spouses regardless of who holds title to the property.”). 
60 See MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982). 
61 See Quick v. Quick, 381 N.W.2d 5, 7–8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (acknowledging the 
husband was the primary wage earner, but the wife’s contribution as a homemaker and the 
twenty-year marriage of the parties justified the equal division of property in the parties’ 
dissolution action). 
9
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C. Just and Equitable Valuation of Property 
Part of a court’s responsibility to make a just and equitable division of 
property involves the challenging issue of assigning a fair value to property 
in a timely manner. In 1979, the legislature gave courts authority to reassess 
a property’s value up to thirty months after a dissolution: 
[W]hen one party is awarded the homestead and the other party 
is awarded a fixed dollar amount based on an assumed or 
appraised market value of the homestead and within 24 months 
following the decree the homestead is sold, within six months of 
the sale either party may petition, and the court may grant, an 
apportionment of the proceeds in the proportion award in the 
decree, based upon the net sale price rather than the assumed or 
appraised market value.62  
The thirty-month post-dissolution window created too much 
uncertainty and was quickly discarded in 1981.63 The legislature’s solution 
to this uncertainty was a statutory provision allowing the court to force the 
sale of the homestead or other marital assets during the pendency of 
marriage dissolution if the circumstances required it.64  
The next important statutory revision for purposes of this case note 
occurred in 1988.65 Historically, marital property included any property that 
was acquired during the existence of the marriage but prior to the date of 
dissolution.66 However, in 1988, the legislature changed the language 
defining “nonmarital property” and established a new cutoff date for 
classifying and valuing marital property—the valuation date.67 Any property 
                                                           
62 MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1979) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019)). 
63 MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1981). 
64 Id. (“If the court finds that it is necessary to preserve the marital assets of the parties, the 
court may order the sale of the homestead of the parties or the sale of other marital assets, 
as the individual circumstances may require, during the pendency of the proceeding for a 
dissolution of marriage or an annulment.”). 
65 Compare MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1988), with MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 
(1982) (clarifying when marital property vests).  
66 MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subdiv. 5 (1951) (current version at Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subdiv. 
3b (2019)) (“‘Property acquired during covertureʼ means any property, real or personal, 
acquired by the parties . . . to a divorce . . . at any time during the marriage relation between 
them . . . .”). 
67 MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subdiv. 5 (1988) (“‘Nonmarital propertyʼ means property real or 
personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage, 
which . . . is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.”); MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 
1 (1988) (“The court shall value marital assets for purposes of division between the parties 
as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless a different 
date is agreed upon by the parties, or unless the court makes specific findings that another 
date of valuation is fair and equitable.”). 
10
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acquired after the valuation date, regardless of a later dissolution date, was 
presumed to be nonmarital property.68 However, the legislature built in 
court discretion by adding that “if there is a substantial change in value of an 
asset between the date of the valuation and the final distribution, the court 
may adjust the valuation of that asset as necessary to effect an equitable 
distribution.”69  
The valuation date was originally the day the proceedings for 
dissolution commenced.70 But in 1989, the legislature clarified that the 
valuation date was the date of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement 
conference, or, if agreed upon by the parties, another date that was deemed 
fair and equitable.71 An early valuation date, such as Minnesota’s, serves to 
protect both spouses.72 For example, a spouse who controls and manages a 
business is protected in the event the value of that business increases 
between the pretrial hearing and trial date due to the individual efforts of 
the managing spouse.73 It confers the benefits of his or her labor. 
Conversely, it also protects the non-managing spouse. Should the spouse 
who controls and manages the business decide to run the business into the 
ground, the non-managing spouse will not suffer any loss as a result of the 
managing spouse’s actions.74 
Choosing a valuation date is one of the most challenging problems 
created by the equitable distribution law and yet is of utmost importance.75 
                                                           
68 MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b(d) (2019); see also Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 
519, 522 (Minn. 1986) (finding future retirement funds were marital property because 
respondent acquired the right to receive retirement funds under the plan during the period 
in which he was employed and married). 
69 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1988) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 
1 (2019)). 
70 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1989). 
71 Id.  
72 See Lynn Weddle Judkins, Comment, The Road to Splitsville: How the Timing of 
Valuation During Marital Dissolution Leads to Costly Detours, 15 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL L. 465 (1998). 
73 Id. at 475–76. 
74 Id. at 474–75, stating:  
Practitioners may also argue that the court should employ this valuation date in 
special, time-is-of-the-essence-type situations, especially ‘where there is evidence 
that a marital asset was dissipated, wasted, or converted to a non-marital form.’ 
This quick alternative protects a spouse from another’s squandering of marital 
assets and allows the protected spouse to retain more resources to start a new 
life. 
(quoting Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 918 n.5 (Alaska 1994)). 
75 Id. at 470–71 (quoting Sutliff v. Sutliff, 543 A.2d 534, 537 (Pa. 1988)) (“[T]he practical 
effect of this procedure may make a difference in the amount of marital property awarded 
and prevent a potential decrease in the clients standard of living [because] ‘value is by no 
11
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In complex divorces, protracted pretrial proceedings and other calendar 
delays often produce a significant interval between the commencement of 
an action and the time of trial.76 During the interim, property values likely 
do not remain constant.77 Minnesota’s legislature recognized this 
conundrum and sought to alleviate its unjust ramifications by implementing 
an early valuation date at the date of the pretrial settlement conference, 
augmented with judicial discretion.78 
D. Contradictions Between the Legislature’s Intent and Defining 
Precedent 
Each amendment to the statue’s language was explicitly implemented 
to offset a negative imbalance that the prior version of the statute 
inadvertently created.79 These imbalances became evident as cases made 
their way through the courts and showed the statute’s imperfections.80 As 
courts resolved the issues that surfaced when parties attempted to comply 
with or avoid the statute, courts created defining precedent to which the 
legislature responded accordingly with a series of amendments to reconcile 
the law with reality.81 
                                                           
means a constant.ʼ Indeed, what appears just at a particular valuation date may not have an 
equitable effect down the road.”); see also Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Proper Date for 
Valuation of Property Being Distributed Pursuant to Divorce, 34 A.L.R.4th 63 (2019).  
76 Judkins, supra note 72, at 475 (“[D]ivorce trial occurs after filing the initial pleading, 
comprehensive financial discovery, and presentation of all evidence supporting one’s 
position.”). 
77 Id. at 474 (“One must also caution practitioners about the effect of early valuation dates on 
increases in marital assets, like stock plans, securities, or business partnerships. Property 
value may rise . . . .”). 
78 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1989). 
79 For a brief discussion of legislative drafting, see HOLC Guide to Legislative Drafting, 
OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 
https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_Legislation/Drafting_Guide.html#VII 
[https://perma.cc/RT2Q-Z9CZ]. 
80 See, e.g., Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 722–723 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding 
when the benefits of an employment-separation agreement are acquired after the valuation 
date, but are related to employment performed during marriage, the benefits are marital 
property); Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987) (holding the trial court 
abused its discretion when it divided the family business without taking into account the wife’s 
contributions to the business and solely considered the husband’s pre-marriage purchase of 
a business interest); Miller v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 738, 742–743 (Minn. 1984) (finding the 
wife played a substantial role in amassing the marital estate even though the acquisition, 
preservation, and appreciation of the marital property was primarily attributable to the 
husband). 
81 See, e.g., Danielson v. Danielson, 392 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) 
(maintaining the trial court’s decision should be reversed only for an abuse of discretion); 
12
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Gill is the latest in the court’s long line of precedent.82 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gill overruled precedent and ignored the 
statute’s carefully crafted text by classifying property acquired after the 
valuation date as marital property.83 As noted, the legislature included ample 
room for judicial discretion to consider all relevant factors in reaching a just 
and equitable division of property. Within the confines of that judicial 
discretion, the Gill court could have reached the same conclusion resulting 
in a just and equitable division of the Gills’ property, but, instead, the court 
chose to carve a new path outside the confines of the law.84 This new 
precedent, even if unintended, could lead to future outcomes that 
undermine the legislature’s intent to make a just and equitable division of 
property. 
III. THE GILL DECISION 
A. Facts 
Both Appellant Stephen and Respondent Gretchen were employed 
when they were married in 1993.85 Stephen was the President of Phillips 
Beverage Company, and Gretchen worked full time selling cable television 
advertising.86 The parties’ roles during the marriage were very traditional—
Stephen was the breadwinner, and Gretchen was the stay-at-home mother 
and wife.87 After the birth of the couple’s first child in 1994, Gretchen gave 
up her career to stay home and raise the parties’ four children.88 Meanwhile, 
Stephen continued to work and advance his earning ability at the Phillips 
Beverage Company.89 
During Stephen and Gretchen’s marriage, Stephen purchased an 
ownership interest in Talenti, a gelato company. In 2008, Stephen and his 
former boss, Eddie Phillips, went in as equal partners and bought a little 
                                                           
Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1986) (stating the appellate court must 
affirm the district court’s decision if it has an acceptable basis in fact and principle even 
though the appellate court might have come to a different conclusion). 
82 Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 2018). 
83 Id. at 298, 311 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 311. 
85 Id. at 298. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 298–99. 
89 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment 
and Decree at 4, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 
8, 2016). At the time of dissolution, Stephen was the Chief Executive Officer of Talenti, 
making a gross annual salary of $362,500 per year. 
13
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over 50% of Talenti for approximately $1.5 million.90 After purchasing 
Talenti, Stephen became its Chief Executive Officer (CEO).91 Stephen’s 
involvement and leadership were significant contributors to Talenti’s growth 
and success.92 Following Stephen’s purchase of Talenti, Stephen formed a 
limited liability company, Wyndmere, LLC (“Wyndmere”), to hold the 
parties’ interest in Talenti.93 The five named owners of Wyndmere are 
Stephen and the parties’ four children.94 Sometime after Wyndmere’s 
creation, Wyndmere acquired a membership interest in Talenti’s parent 
company, David Goliath Group, LLC (DGG).95 
Other members of the Talenti team were added over the ensuing 
years, and some purchased an interest in the company. Additionally, in 
2011, Eddie Phillips died, and his interest passed to his sons, Dean and 
Tyler Phillips.96 Dean subsequently joined the team, but Tyler did not.97 The 
following chart shows the members, individual owners, and ownership 
percentage of DGG:98 
 





Fialko, LLC Dean B. Phillips  
 
38.7043% 
Tyler J. Phillips 
Dean B. Phillips 
Revocable Trust u/a/d 
February 26, 1993 
Tyler J. Phillips 
Revocable Trust u/a/d 
April 27, 1994 





Gill Family Irrevocable 
Trust FBO Chandler 
Susan Gill u/a/d 
February 14, 2011 
Gill Family Irrevocable 
Trust FBO Paige 
Madison Gill u/a/d 
                                                           






96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 11. 
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February 14, 2011 
Gill Family Irrevocable 
Trust FBO McKenzie 
Elizabeth Gill u/a/d 
February 14, 2011 
Gill Family Irrevocable 
Trust FBO Taylor 
Francis Gill u/a/d 
February 14, 2011 
Hochschuler, LLC Joshua Hochschuler 18.2914% 
Carole Silverman 
The Majody Helms, 
LLC 
Jack P. Helms 3.3000% 
Kent Pilakowski Kent Pilakowski 1.000% 
 
 Even though Gretchen is not listed as an owner of DGG, it was not 
disputed that she had marital ownership in both Wyndmere and David 
Goliath because both were acquired during the parties’ marriage.99 In 2013, 
DGG decided to sell Talenti and began negotiations with Unilever N.V. and 
Conopco Inc. (collectively, “Unilever”).100 Negotiations continued for 
approximately one year, culminating in a letter of intent signed in July 
2014.101 The sale terms set out in the letter of intent were consistent with the 
final purchase agreement, wherein the purchase price was split between a 
$180 million upfront payment and two future, contingent earn-out payments 
worth up to $170 million.102 Each member had a right to receive their 
percentage of the earn-out payments, regardless of whether they worked for 
Talenti after the sale.103 
B. Procedural History 
Stephen petitioned for a dissolution of his marriage to Gretchen in 
August 2014.104 The district court set the dissolution’s valuation date for 
September 5, 2014,105 before the purchase agreement for Talenti’s sale was 
                                                           
99 See Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Minn. 2018); see also MINN. STAT. § 518.003, 
subdiv. 3b (2016) (“‘Marital propertyʼ means property . . . acquired by the parties, or either 
of them . . . at any time during the existence of the marriage relation between them . . . but 
prior to the date of valuation . . . .”). 
100 Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 299. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 300. 
104 Id. at 299.  
105 Id.  
15
Cicotte: Property: Right Outcome, Wrong Reason—Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 29
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2020
2020] CASE NOTE: GILL V. GILL  859 
  
executed on December 2, 2014.106 At the valuation hearing, the court valued 
Talenti at $180 million based on the up-front sale price in the letter of intent, 
which the court determined was the “present value” of the business.107 The 
court also found that the value was consistent with other acquisitions of 
similarly-situated frozen dessert companies.108 However, when the court 
valued Talenti, it did not consider the earn-out payments that were also 
referenced in the letter of intent.109 
The Talenti sale closed on December 2, 2014, after the valuation date 
but before the final dissolution of the parties’ marriage.110 The purchase 
agreement was consistent with the terms in the July letter of intent and 
consisted of a $180 million upfront payment, followed by the two earn-out 
payments that were dependent upon Talenti’s performance during the 
following two years.111 The purchase agreement specified a formula for 
calculating the earn-out payments, which could potentially total $170 
million.112 When the earn-out payments were realized, they would be 
available to all members.113  
The contract language provided: 
SECTION 1.01. The Asset Purchase. . . . (b) As additional 
consideration for the Assets, the Company shall also be eligible 
to receive from Asset Buyer (i) an amount equal to the First Earn-
out Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to the Second Earn-out 
Payment . . . . 
SECTION 1.02. The Distribution. . . . [I]mmediately following 
the consummation of the Asset Purchase, [David Goliath] shall 
effect a distribution to the Members of (a) the Asset Purchase 
Payment and (b) the right to receive (i) an amount equal to the 
First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to the 
Second Earn-out Payment . . . . 
SECTION 1.03. The Membership Unit Purchase. . . . (b) As 
additional consideration for the Membership Units, the 
Members shall also be eligible to receive from Unit Buyer (i) an 
                                                           
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 309 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
108 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment 
and Decree at 10, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 
8, 2016). 
109 Id. at 30.  
110 Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 299 n.4. 
111 Id. at 299–300. 
112 Id. at 300. 
113 Id. 
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amount equal to the First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an 
amount equal to the Second Earn-out Payment . . . .114 
The non-working members included: Eddie Phillips’ son, Tyler 
Phillips; Josh Hochschuler’s mother, Carole Silverman; and the Gill’s four 
daughters, Taylor, McKenzie, Paige, and Chandler.115 In addition, Stephen 
negotiated a separate, two-year employment contract with Unilever, 
agreeing to be Talenti’s CEO for a salary of $362,500 in the first year and 
$375,625 the next.116 
The dissolution of Stephen and Gretchen’s marriage was final on 
January 4, 2016, only one month after the sale of Talenti.117 Shortly after, 
Gretchen challenged the district court’s classification of the earn-out 
payments as nonmarital property.118 To rule on Gretchen’s post-trial motion, 
the district court looked to the plain language of section 518.003, 
subdivision 3b, of the Minnesota Statutes119 and determined that the earn-
out payments were nonmarital property because they were acquired by 
Stephen after the valuation date and were compensation for work Stephen 
would do in the future.120 According to the district court, Gretchen was only 
entitled to her marital share of Talenti as it was assessed on the valuation 
date.121 
Gretchen appealed the district court’s decision, and the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that contract interpretation governed 
the classification of earn-out payments as marital or nonmarital property.122 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the sale’s contract branded 
both the upfront payment and the future earn-out payments as 
“consideration,” and, therefore, the earn-out payments were not 
compensation but part of the sale price.123 Therefore, the earn-out payments 
were marital property and Stephen’s share should have been divided 
accordingly.124  
                                                           
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 298–99. 
116 Id. at 300. 
117 Id.  
118 Id. at 301. 
119 MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3d(b) (2016) (“‘Nonmarital propertyʼ means property real 
or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage, 
which . . . is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.”). 
120 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment 
and Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 
8, 2016). 
121 Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 309 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
122 Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
123 Id. at 720–21. 
124 Id. 
17
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 Stephen appealed, but upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed the court of appeals and remanded the case back to the district 
court to value and equitably divide Stephen’s portion of the earn-out 
payments with Gretchen.125 The court concluded that “[a] sale of marital 
property during dissolution proceedings, regardless of when that sale 
occurs, results in the proceeds from the sale also being marital property, the 
value of which is defined by the contract selling that asset.”126 
Additionally, the court affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
determination that the earn-out payments were a contractual right from the 
sale of a marital asset that was acquired before the valuation date, subject to 
the court’s valuation and equitable division.127 Further, the earn-out 
payments were not compensation for work Stephen would do in the future 
because every DGG member was entitled to share in the payments, 
regardless of future employment with the company.128 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, however, was not 
unanimous. The dissent argued that the original district court holding 
should stand and noted that the district court set new, unnecessary 
precedent that was undesirable because it did not utilize appropriate 
standards of review, did not apply the law as written, and took away the 
flexibility of the statute’s judicial discretion.129 By doing so, the majority 
undermined the legislature’s intent to protect the homemaker and eliminate 
gender and role bias in a marriage dissolution.130 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Minnesota, when dividing property in a marriage dissolution, a 
court’s primary charge is to make the division just and equitable.131 Yet, when 
the district court denied Gretchen Gill a portion of the earn-out payments 
from Talenti’s sale, it was neither just, nor equitable.132 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court recognized the district court’s failure to fulfill its charge and 
attempted to remedy it.133 In one respect, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
succeeded—it made a just and equitable division. But in other respects, it 
                                                           
125 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 307 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
126 Id. at 303–04. 
127 Id. at 304. 
128 Id. at 305. 
129 See id. at 308 (Anderson, J., dissenting).  
130 See supra Part II. 
131 MINN. STAT. §518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
132 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment 
and Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 
8, 2016). 
133 See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 308. 
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failed because it needlessly created new precedent that overrode the 
legislature’s purposeful establishment of a valuation date and moved away 
from judicial discretion that allowed the court to protect homemakers like 
Gretchen Gill.134  
The same just and equitable result could have been attained 
completely within the confines of the law, using appropriate standards of 
review.135 A thorough analysis of the standards of review at each judicial stage 
of Gill will illustrate how a just and equitable result could have been reached 
at any stage and why new precedent was unnecessary.  
A. Minnesota Standards of Review 
Minnesota has adopted basic standards of review that must be applied 
when reviewing findings of fact and questions of law, including contract and 
statutory interpretation.136 These standards of review merit some discussion 
because they limited the ways the reviewing courts in Gill could overturn the 
district court’s decision.137  
1. Findings of Fact 
There are two kinds of findings of fact: oral and documentary. The 
legislature does not differentiate between the two.138 Deference to the lower 
court is required when reviewing findings of fact. Under Minnesota Rules 
of Civil Procedure, findings of fact cannot be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous.139 A district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error 
to see if there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the court’s 
findings.140 Even if there is reasonable evidence to support a finding of fact, 
the finding can still be clearly erroneous if the reviewing court, on the entire 
evidence, is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed.”141 When determining whether a finding of fact is clearly 
                                                           
134 See infra Section IV.D. 
135 See infra Section IV.D. 
136 See The Minnesota Court of Appeals Standards of Review, MNCOURTS.GOV (Aug. 2019), 
http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Appellate/Court%20of%20Appeals/Standard
s-of-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4DH-FF8T]. 
137 Id.  
138 Tarr v. Tarr, No. C9-93-2216, 1994 WL 91203, at *3 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1994) 
(stating that the 1985 amendment to Rule 52.01 overruled In re Trust Known as Great 
Northern Iron Ore Properties, 243 N.W.2d 302 (1976), and the clearly erroneous standard 
now governs findings based on documentary as well as oral evidence). 
139 MINN. R. CIV. P. 52.01 (2019). 
140 Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). 
141 Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997) (citing In re Trust Known as Great 
Northern Iron Ore Properties, 308 Minn. 221, 224, 243 N.W.2d 302, 305 (1976)). 
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erroneous, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.142 
Applied to Gill, the valuation of Talenti is a finding of fact. Valuation 
is an approximation and need only lie within a reasonable range of figures.143 
The Gill valuation, made without a jury, cannot be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous based on the record as a whole.144  
2. Questions of Law 
Minnesota courts generally review questions of law de novo and 
examine how a district court applied the law to stipulated facts.145 No 
deference is given to a lower court on questions of law;146 however, a 
reviewing court must still defer to a district court’s underlying findings of 
fact.147  
Applied to Gill, classification of proceeds from Talenti’s sale—
including its earn-out payments—as marital or nonmarital property is a 
question of law, reviewed de novo.148 This differs from the valuation of 
Talenti, a finding of fact that is reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard.149 
3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact 
Minnesota courts reviewing mixed questions of law and fact “accord 
the district court discretion in its ultimate conclusions and review such 
conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard.”150 If it is clear that a 
district court improperly applied the law or made findings of fact that are 
clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record, an abuse of discretion 
has occurred.151 Applied to Gill, the district court had broad discretion in its 
                                                           
142 Id.  
143 Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 145, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (1975). 
144 Id.  
145 Harlow v. State Depʼt of Human Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016). 
146 Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003). 
147 Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. Ct. App.1986). 
148 Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). 
149 Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 145, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (1975). 
150 In re Estate of Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Porch v. 
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)). 
151 In re Marriage of Erickson, No. A10-365, 2010 WL 3958676, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 
12, 2010); see also Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824) (“Courts are the 
mere instruments of the law and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, 
it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed 
by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is 
never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, always for the purpose 
20
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determination of the appropriate property division. The district court’s 
determination cannot be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.152 
4. Contract Interpretation 
Contract interpretation and whether language in a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law reviewed de novo.153 Determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous “depends on the meaning assigned to the words and 
phrases in accordance with the apparent purpose of the contract as a 
whole.”154 “The language of a contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two 
or more reasonable interpretations.” 155  
If a contract is ambiguous, contract interpretation is a finding of fact. 
However, with an unambiguous contract, interpretation is a question of 
law.156 In Gill, the purchase agreement was deemed unambiguous, and its 
interpretation was reviewed de novo.157  
5. Statutory Interpretation 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that Minnesota 
courts review de novo.158 The goal when interpreting a statute “is to ascertain 
and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”159 When the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent 
and must be given effect.160 However, when a statute is silent on a key point 
and is subject to different plausible interpretations, the statute must be 
considered ambiguous.161 If a statute is ambiguous, the legislature’s intent 
                                                           
of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.”). For a 
discussion of abuse of discretion, see 3 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST APPEAL AND ERROR 
§ 12.09 (2019). 
152 In re Marriage of Hart, No. A06-243, 2007 WL 738671, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 
2007). 
153 Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. 2016); Halla Nursery, 
Inc. v. City of Chanhassen, 781 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. 2010). 
154 Halla Nursery, 781 N.W.2d at 884.  
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 304 (quoting Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn. 2010)) (“When 
the [contractual] language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the agreement of the parties 
as expressed in the language of the contract.”). 
157 Storms, Inc., 883 N.W.2d at 776. 
158 Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016); see also Swenson v. 
Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. 2011). 
159 MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019). 
160 Tuma v. Commʼr of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.16 (2019). 
161 Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001). 
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may be ascertained by considering a number of factors, including the 
legislative history, the necessity for the law, and the consequences of various 
interpretations.162 Additionally, certain presumptions apply, including the 
presumption that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.163 
In its effort to obtain a just and equitable division of property, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Gill failed to adhere to these standards. 
However, as discussed later, the Gill court could have adhered to these 
standards and avoided setting new precedent, all while achieving a just and 
equitable division of the Gills’ material assets.164 
B. Examination of the District Court’s Opinion  
The district court’s role is to hear disputes and resolve them by making 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.165 In Gill, the district court’s role was 
to make a just and equitable distribution of property under the governing 
law, sections 518.58 and 518.003 of the Minnesota Statutes.  
1. The District Court’s Holding and Reasoning 
The first issue the district court addressed was whether the earn-out 
payments were marital property accrued during the marriage.166 To resolve 
this, the district court applied section 518.003, subdivision 3b(d), of the 
Minnesota Statutes, which defines “nonmarital property” as any property 
acquired after the valuation date.167 Under this oversimplification of the 
governing statute,168 the district court determined that the relevant factor was 
confined to the value of Talenti as of the valuation date because the sale of 
Talenti occurred after the valuation date and proceeds from that sale were 
Stephen’s nonmarital property.169   
                                                           
162 MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019). 
163 Id. § 645.17 (2019). 
164 See infra Section IV.D. 
165 See District Courts, MNCOURTS.GOV, http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/
CIOMediaLibrary/DocumentLibrary/QF-District-Courts2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAA2-
R4UR]. 
166 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and 
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 
2016). 
167 MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019). 
168 See infra Section IV.B.2. 
169 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and 
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 
2016). 
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On the valuation date, Talenti’s estimated value was $180 million.170 
The district court justified this value through several means. First, it accepted 
testimony about the critical nature of the sale’s timing and the sensitive 
negotiations between Unilever and Talenti because Unilever was the only 
available buyer.171 Second, the district court found Unilever’s desire to buy 
Talenti was based exclusively on its current value, not on any future 
projections for growth.172 Finally, Talenti’s proposed value was deemed fair 
because it was similar to prices paid for other comparable companies and 
fell within the industry range.173 For these reasons, the district court held that 
Gretchen “received full marital value for Talenti as of the date of 
valuation.”174 
Despite the district court’s conclusion of the essential issue of 
classification, the district court continued to address other claims as required 
by law.175 The final claim needing attention was Gretchen’s claim that the 
earn-out payments were part of Unilever’s scheduled payments to purchase 
the parties’ marital ownership in Talenti, not payments for Stephen’s post-
marital efforts to grow Talenti after the sale.176  
To address this additional claim, the district court first analyzed the 
contract language and determined that the “additional consideration” did 
not encompass the earn-out payments for Talenti but rather involved the 
promise of opportunity to prove future growth and be rewarded for that 
growth.177 Second, the district court dismissed Talenti’s tax documents that 
referred to the sale as an installment sale.178 Third, the district court pointed 
                                                           
170 Id. at 13. 
171 Id. at 12. 
172 Id. at 13. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 11. 
175 See Gordon Shumaker, Trial Procedures & Practices for Judges, MNBENCHBOOK.ORG 
(Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.mnbenchbook.org/index.php?title=AVOIDING_REMAND 
[https://perma.cc/CZ3S-QX5K] (“Parties will often assert claims and alternative claims, or 
they will raise multiple issues in motions. You must address them all. That does not mean 
that you have to decide and explain each issue, but you must do 2 things: Acknowledge each 
and [e]ither decide it or state why it is not necessary to reach it or to decide it, or why you 
are unable to decide it. Parties who bring appeals often allege that the district court 
overlooked an issue that would have changed the outcome of the case and they point to the 
fact that the court did not even mention that issue . . . .”). 
176 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment 
and Decree at 11–16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., 
Apr. 8, 2016). 
177 Id. at 11. 
178 Id. 
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to the uncertainty of obtaining the earn-out payments.179 Fourth, the district 
court determined that the earn-out payments were intended as 
compensation for Stephen’s future work at Talenti.180 And finally, the district 
court acknowledged that all members, including passive members, would 
receive a share of the earn-out payments proportionate to their ownership, 
but the court quickly dismissed this acknowledgment as an unrelated 
decision among the DGG members and Unilever.181  
For these reasons, the court held in dictum that “the earn-outs, if 
obtained, will be a result of [Stephen’s] significant post-marital labor and 
should be awarded to him as his nonmarital property.”182 
2. Errors in the District Court’s Holding and Reasoning 
A trial court has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property 
in a marital dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of 
discretion.183 The district court’s holding was an abuse of discretion and was 
neither just nor equitable. 
When the district court made its decision regarding classification of 
proceeds from the sale of Talenti, it only used authority from section 
518.003, subdivision 3b, Definitions: Marital property; exceptions, of the 
Minnesota Statutes. Yet this section explicitly points to section 518.58, 
Division of Marital Property, as the dominant authority for making a 
division of marital property.184 
Using section 518.58 is critically important because it contains the 
essential mandate to make a just and equitable division and provides the 
means to do so through obligatory consideration of “all relevant factors.” 185 
It also provides that if there is a substantial change in the value of an asset 
between the date of valuation and the final distribution, the court may adjust 
the valuation of that asset as necessary to effect an equitable distribution; a 
                                                           
179 Id. at 14. 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 15. 
182 Id. at 16. 
183 See Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Chamberlain v. 
Chamberlain, 615 N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)) (“District courts have broad 
discretion over the division of marital property and appellate courts will not alter a district 
court’s property division absent a clear abuse of discretion or an erroneous application of 
the law.”). 
184 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
185 See Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989) (“Effective appellate review of the 
exercise of [the trial court’s] discretion is possible only when the trial court has issued 
sufficiently detailed findings of fact to demonstrate its consideration of all factors relevant to 
[equitable division].”). 
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grant of discretion very pertinent to Gill.186 The district court’s complete 
failure to apply section 518.58 is an abuse of discretion because the district 
court made its conclusion without consideration of all the circumstances and 
applicable law.187 
3. How the District Court Could Have Strengthened Its Holding and 
Reasoning 
The district court should have done two things differently to have its 
decision upheld on appeal. First, the court should have carefully and 
methodically used all the governing law to reach its conclusion. Section 
518.58 and section 518.003, subdivision 3b, are companion statutes, 
intended to be applied in tandem when making a division of marital 
property.188 Second, as an extension to the prior suggestion, the court should 
have exercised the discretion afforded by section 518.58, subdivision 1—the 
discretion to change a property’s value post-valuation date—because the facts 
showed a substantial change in Talenti’s value post-valuation date.189  
Discretion, when given, must be exercised.190 Exercising discretion 
means that the court has deliberately considered all relevant factors and 
                                                           
186 Id. 
187 See Shumaker, supra note 175 (“When a statute or rule requires that you make findings 
as to various elements, do so, and be sure to cover all of the essential elements. . . . [A]void 
remands by making it clear that you have done everything the law requires you to do in 
resolving an issue or a case.”). Judges often make decisions on the fly and rely on attorneys’ 
legal support for their position. While a judge should be able to rely on attorneys to bring 
the most relevant cases and law to the judge’s attention, it is ultimately up to the judge to get 
it right. Judge Mel Dickstein, How Judges Make Decisions, MINNPOST (Sept. 9, 2014), 
https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2014/09/how-judges-make-decisions/ 
[https://perma.cc/937Q-S2P4]. In Gill, none of the attorneys raised their claims in light of 
pertinent case law and section 518.58 of the Minnesota Statutes. See generally Brief for 
Appellant, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. A16-1421), 2017 WL 2210733; 
Respondent’s Brief and Addendum, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. A16-1421), 
2018 WL 2283065; Appellant’s Reply Brief, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. A16-
1421), 2018 WL 2283066; Brief for Respondent, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. 
A16-1421), 2017 WL 2210734; Proposed Second Partial Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Family Ct. Div., Mar. 
18, 2016). 
188 MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019) (“‘Marital propertyʼ means property . . . 
acquired by the parties . . . prior to the date of valuation under section 518.58, subdivision 
1.”). 
189 Id. 
190 See State v. Grover, No. A16-1565, 2017 WL 3469449, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 
2017) (“[I]f the district court has discretion . . . it must exercise that discretion by deliberately 
considering circumstances for and against . . . . When the record demonstrates that an 
exercise of discretion has not occurred, the case must be remanded . . . .”). 
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based its decision upon them.191 In Gill, the court did not exercise the 
obligatory discretion, primarily because it did not apply the law that 
mandated discretion.  
To properly exercise discretion, the district court should have 
considered the substantial change in Talenti’s value between the valuation 
date and the final distribution.192 Exercising this discretion does not mean 
the court was obliged to adjust Talenti’s value, only that it needed to 
consider the change in value to effect an equitable distribution.193  
Instead, the district court applied an inflexible standard based solely 
upon section 518.003, subdivision 3b, that merely defines nonmarital 
property as property acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.194 If the 
district court had properly applied section 518.58, there would likely be no 
basis to conclude that it abused its discretion. 
It is not clear whether the district court thought it made a just and 
equitable division of the Gill’s property, but it does appear that it felt 
constrained to follow the law.195 The district court reached the only outcome 
possible through inflexible application of section 518.003, subdivision 3b, 
that proceeds from the sale of Talenti are nonmarital property because they 
were acquired after the valuation date.196 Use of section 518.58 would have 
been liberating by allowing the district court to consider all relevant factors 
to make a truly just and equitable division.  
Had the district court applied the relevant law and exercised discretion 
where required, the court would have presented a stronger case and its 
decision would likely have been affirmed upon review by the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals. 
C. Examination of the Court of Appeals’ Opinion 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has the authority to review decisions 
of the district court, but it is limited by established standards of review that 
prescribe the level of scrutiny it must apply.197 This was the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals’ challenge in Gill—to operate within established standards of 
review but still find a way to reverse the district court’s judgment, which the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals considered unjust and inequitable.198  
                                                           
191 Id. 
192 Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
193 See Grover, 2017 WL 3469449, at *2. 
194 MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019). 
195 See MNCOURTS.GOV, supra note 165. 
196 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 304 (Minn. 2018). 
197 See supra Section IV.A. 
198 Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
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1. The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning and Holding  
The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not address the district court’s 
essential holding—whether the earn-out payments were marital property 
accrued during the marriage before the valuation date.199 Rather, it 
addressed the district court’s obiter dictum—whether “earn-out payments 
from the sale of a marital interest in a company are husband’s nonmarital 
property by virtue of his having worked for the purchaser during the earn-
out period under a separate employment agreement.”200 The Minnesota 
Court of Appeals determined this to be a classification issue, subject to de 
novo review.201 
To add to the confusion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded 
that the amount Unilever paid for Talenti reflected the value of the company 
at the valuation date.202 Therefore, the question the court answered was not 
the one it asked—whether the earn-out payments were marital property. The 
question it answered was how much Unilever agreed to pay.203 Valuation, 
however, is a question of fact to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard.204  
To resolve this conundrum, the Minnesota Court of Appeals focused 
on interpretation of the purchase agreement and concluded that the contract 
was unambiguous based on its perceived plain meaning.205 Under this 
finding, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the plain meaning of 
the purchase agreement clearly identified the upfront payment and future 
earn-out payments as “consideration” for Talenti’s purchase, with an agreed 
upon formula for calculating the earn-out payments.206 Further, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals found the earn-out payments were not 
compensation for Stephen’s post-sale efforts because he was compensated 
through a separate employment agreement.207 Additionally, the purchase 
agreement specified that all members of DGG would receive an equitable 
share of the earn-out payments, regardless of whether they worked for 
                                                           
199 See Shumaker, supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
200 Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 719. 
201 Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997). 
202 Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 720. 
203 Id. 
204 “There is caselaw authority that the mislabeling of a finding of fact as a conclusion of law, 
or vice versa, is not determinative of the true nature of the item.” Dailey v. Chermak, 709 
N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Graphic Arts Educ. Found., Inc. v. State, 
240 Minn. 143, 145–46, 59 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1953)). 
205 Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 721. 
206 Id. at 720. 
207 Id. at 722. 
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Talenti at the time of sale or continued working for Talenti in the future.208 
This significantly undercut the district court’s conclusion that earn-outs were 
nonmarital property earned by Stephen as compensations for his services. 
The court also found that because the earn-out payments were part of the 
purchase price, they reflected Talenti’s value as of the valuation date.  
For these reasons, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the earn-
out payments were marital property and remanded the case back to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.209   
2. Errors in the Court of Appeals’ Reasoning and Holding 
Unlike the district court’s judgment, the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ 
judgment produced a just and equitable result: Gretchen received her fair 
share of Talenti’s sale proceeds. But like the district court, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals’ judgment did not comport with the law. There are three 
errors committed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 
First, the Minnesota Court of Appeals erroneously only reviewed the 
part of the district court’s decision that was obiter dictum.210 Thus, even 
though the court came to a different conclusion from the district court and 
held that the earn-out payments were marital property, the holding was not 
based on a review of the district court’s central holding: whether the right to 
the earn-out payments was marital property accrued during the marriage.211 
Unlike the district court, when the Minnesota Court of Appeals set out to 
determine whether Gretchen received a just and equitable distribution, it 
focused primarily on how much Unilever agreed to pay.212 Whereas, when 
                                                           
208 Id. at 719. Some of Talentiʼs current leadership team would not be continuing 
employment with Unilever. For example, Dean Phillips would be leaving the company to 
care for his daughter who was battling cancer, yet, would still receive a portion of earn-outs 
prorated according to his ownership interest in DGG. Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No. 
27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 2016). 
209 Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 722. 
210 See supra notes 175–182 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of dicta, see 
generally Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why it Matters, 76 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 219 (2010), https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1217&context=blr [https://perma.cc/KRT7-74G2]. “To the extent that courts treat 
dicta as holding, they are more likely to reach incorrect decisions, to exceed their judicial 
authority, and to generate illegitimate results.” Id. at 221. This is precisely what happened in 
Gill when the Minnesota Court of Appeals focused solely on the district court’s dicta to reach 
a different conclusion.  
211 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and 
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 
2016). 
212 Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 720. 
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the district court set out to determine whether Gretchen received a just and 
equitable distribution, it focused primarily on how much Talenti was worth 
on the valuation date.213 This revision of the issue changed the nature of the 
case from a question of classification to a question of valuation and contract 
interpretation.  
Second, the Minnesota Court of Appeals improperly determined that 
proceeds from the sale of Talenti were marital property.214 This was 
improper because the sale occurred after the valuation date, and the 
governing statute clearly states that “‘Nonmarital property’ means property 
real or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the 
existence of their marriage, which . . . is acquired by a spouse after the 
valuation date.”215 The only way to circumvent the timing of Talenti’s sale 
after the valuation date was through the use of judicial discretion—afforded 
by the statute—to adjust the valuation, which the court did not use.216 
Third, like the district court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did not 
apply all the governing law.217 The court of appeals only referenced the 
governing statutes once to conclude that the parties’ ownership of Talenti 
was presumptively marital property.218 The court did not address the 
directive in section 518.003, subdivision 3b, that property acquired after the 
valuation date is nonmarital property, nor did the court apply any of the 
discretionary factors afforded in section 518.58 to ensure a just and 
equitable division. Instead, the court awarded Gretchen a share of the earn-
out payments in a willy-nilly fashion without proper reference to governing 
law.  
These three errors led to an inadequate resolution and left the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ holding open to further review by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court. 
                                                           
213 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and 
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 
2016). 
214 Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 722. 
215 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
216 Id. (“If there is a substantial change in value of an asset between the date of valuation and 
the final distribution, the court may adjust the valuation of that asset as necessary to effect an 
equitable distribution.”). 
217 See supra Section IV.B.2. 
218 Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 720; see also MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019). 
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3. How the Court of Appeals Could Have Strengthened Its Holding 
The court of appeals’ short opinion and disregard of applicable law 
may have been, in effect, a punt to the supreme court.219 However, if its punt 
was unintentional, the court could have strengthened its opinion to comport 
with the law and avoid further review in three ways. 
First, the Minnesota Court of Appeals should have focused its analysis 
on the district court’s arbitrary and capricious application of the law—its 
complete failure to apply section 518.58—and found that the district court 
abused its discretion.220 Only after the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
established that the district court abused its discretion, could it overrule the 
district court’s finding of fact, Talenti’s valuation, because it was clearly 
erroneous.221 The valuation was clearly erroneous because the district court 
did not consider all the relevant factors, i.e. the timing of Talenti’s sale or 
the letter of intent that was signed before the valuation date and substantially 
mirrored the purchase agreement, or exercise its discretion to adjust 
Talenti’s value based on these relevant factors. 
Second, although the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ de novo 
interpretation of the contract to determine whether the earn-out payments 
were part of the sales proceeds was critical to the final analysis, it was only 
necessary and proper as a means to determine Talenti’s value—not as a 
means to determine whether Talenti’s proceeds were marital property.222 
The question of whether Talenti’s proceeds were marital property should 
have been determined through the use of judicial discretion afforded by the 
governing statutes, not through contract interpretation. 
Finally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals could have written its opinion 
more precisely to address the subtle nuances between classification and 
valuation that have continually caused errors throughout the course of 
litigation. If the Minnesota Court of Appeals had done these three things, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court could have easily affirmed the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals’ decision without establishing new precedent. 
                                                           
219 Minnesota Judicial Branch, Minnesota Court of Appeals, MNCOURTS.GOV 
http://www.mncourts.gov/courtofappeals.aspx [https://perma.cc/9R83-9M5Q] (“As the 
error-correcting court, the Court of Appeals handles most of the appeals, which allows the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to spend time resolving difficult constitutional and public policy 
cases. Court of Appeals’ decisions are the final ruling in about ninety-five percent of the 
2,000 to 2,400 appeals every year. Typically, about five percent of the Court’s decisions are 
accepted by the Minnesota Supreme Court for further review.”). 
220 See supra Section IV.B.2. 
221 Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
222 See supra Section IV.B.2 for a discussion of how the court of appeals improperly based 
its review solely on the district court’s dicta rather than the district court’s essential holding.  
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D. Examination of the Supreme Court’s Opinion 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s challenge was to affirm the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ just and equitable holding while reconciling 
the holding to comport with the law. To do so, the court properly returned 
to the district court’s essential issue: whether proceeds from Talenti’s sale, 
including future contingent earn-out payments, were marital or nonmarital 
property.223 
1. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning and Holding 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis was much more in depth 
than the Minnesota Court of Appeals’, as it tried to reconcile the just and 
equitable outcome of the court of appeals’ contract interpretation with the 
district court’s rigid adherence to the valuation date. It attempted this 
reconciliation through a multi-step process. First, the court established that 
ownership of Talenti was a marital asset.224 Next, the court substituted the 
contractual rights from Talenti’s sale to stand in the place of the marital 
asset.225 Finally, the court determined the scope of the contractual right—
whether the earn-out payments were part of the sale price—and concluded 
that the earn-out payments were marital property.226 
a. Standards of Review 
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged all the proper standards 
of review—an important step to create a solid foundation for its decision.227 
The court determined that: (1) whether property is marital or nonmarital is 
a question of law reviewed de novo; (2) unambiguous contracts are 
interpreted de novo; (3) deference must be given to the district court’s 
findings of fact, which cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous; (4) a 
district court’s evaluation and division of property cannot be overturned 
unless the court abused its discretion; and (5) if the reviewing court is left 
with the clear and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, then the 
                                                           
223 Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 298 (Minn. 2018). 
224 Id. (“[T]he parties’ interest in the company was marital property that was acquired before 
the valuation date . . . .”). 
225 Id. at 304 (“Because Wyndmere received a contractual right to receive the earn-out 
payments from the pre-dissolution sale of a marital asset that was acquired before the 
valuation date, we conclude that the earn-out payments, as direct proceeds from the sale, are 
marital property subject to the court's valuation and equitable division.”).  
226 Id. (“To determine the scope of the contractual rights that Wyndmere received from the 
sale of the parties’ marital asset, we look to the sale's purchase agreement.”). 
227 See MNCOURTS.GOV, supra note 219. 
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district court’s decision can be found to be clearly erroneous, 
notwithstanding the existence of evidence to support such findings.228 
b. Statutory Application 
The Minnesota Supreme Court referenced both applicable statutes—
sections 518.003 and 518.58.229  
Within section 518.003, subdivision 3b, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court emphasized that all property acquired subsequent to the marriage and 
before the valuation date is presumed to be marital property, regardless of 
whether title is held individually or by both spouses; that each spouse has a 
common ownership in marital property that vests no later than the time of 
the entry of the decree in a proceeding for dissolution; and that nonmarital 
property is property acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.230  
Within section 518.58, the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized the 
statute’s mandate that the court make a just and equitable distribution of 
marital property.231 Additionally, the court reasoned that the judicial 
discretion, afforded in section 518.58, subdivision 3, to force the sale of 
marital property for equitable purposes, could reasonably be expanded to 
include a consensual sale. As such, the sale proceeds would be marital 
property.232 
c. Contractual Analysis 
The Minnesota Supreme Court used Minnesota precedent to cement 
both its expansive interpretation of marital property that upheld the 
legislature’s intent to incorporate the contributions of both spouses233 and its 
narrow interpretation of nonmarital property to reinforce the limited 
exceptions as exclusive of all other exceptions.234 
After grounding its decision in statutory authority and case law, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court made its critical and distinctive observation—
whether property is classified as marital depends on when it was acquired.235 
                                                           
228 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301–03. 
229 MINN. STAT. §§ 518.003, subdiv. 3b, 518.58, (2019). 
230 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 302. 
231 Id. at 303. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 302–03; see also Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 650 (Minn. 2008); Nardini v. 
Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987). 
234 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 302–03; see also MINN. STAT. § 645.19 (2019) (“Exceptions expressed 
in a law shall be construed to exclude all other.”); Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752, 755 
(Minn. 1983).  
235 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 303.  
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The court maintained that the earn-out payments were not acquired, but 
received, in exchange for already-acquired marital property.236 As an 
exchange, the sale converted the parties’ marital asset from an indirect 
membership interest in Talenti into a contractual right to receive proceeds 
from its sale.237 
After establishing that the contractual rights in the sales proceeds were 
marital property received through exchange, the court proceeded to analyze 
whether earn-out payments were included within the scope of those 
contractual rights.238 Like the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court interpreted the contractual language de novo.239 The 
unambiguous language of the purchase agreement provided that all DGG 
members would receive a right to a proportional share of the earn-out 
payments.240 Further, the plain language indicated that the earn-out 
payments are consideration for the sale, not compensation for Stephen’s 
future work.241  
In tandem with its contract interpretation, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court cited section 518.58, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes to 
establish that the court must base its equitable division “on all relevant 
factors.”242 It determined a relevant factor was the right conferred on all 
DGG members regardless of any post-sale efforts.243 Thus, equity required 
Gretchen to receive a portion of the earn-out payments based on her pro-
rata share of DGG.  
Through this analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision and held: 
[B]ecause the parties’ interest in the company was marital property that 
was acquired before the valuation date, the consideration of the company, 
which occurred before the dissolution and included an amount paid at the 
time of the sale and a contractual right to receive future amounts, is also 
marital property.244 
                                                           
236 Id. It must be noted, however, that the court’s substitution of “exchanged” for “acquired” 
comes confusingly close to the definition of nonmarital property in section 518.003, 
subdivision 3b, of the Minnesota Statutes. Section 518.003 describes nonmarital property as 
property acquired by either spouse which is “in exchange for or is the increase in value of 
property which is described in clauses (a), (b), (d), and (e).” Clause (d) refers to property 
acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.  
237 Id. at 304. 
238 Id.  
239 Id. at 304–05. 
240 Id. at 304. 
241 Id. at 305. 
242 Id. at 307. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. at 297. 
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2. Errors in the Supreme Court’s Reasoning and Holding 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a just and equitable outcome 
but ignored existing precedent and statutory language to obtain its result and 
created new precedent that is both unnecessary and overreaching.245 In 
reaching its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court made three creative, 
but erroneous, uses of the law.246 
First, even though the court did a better job of setting out statutory 
authority for its decision, it still missed the mark by ignoring the valuation 
date like the district court.247 To counter this, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
made the semantic, but material, switch from “acquired” to “exchanged” 
and created a distinction that would allow the substitution of a contractual 
right for a marital asset.248 Regardless of semantics, the contractual right to 
receive the earn-out payments still came after the valuation date.249 Yet, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the earn-out payments were for 
the sale of marital property, which made the timing irrelevant.250 The only 
legitimate way to subvert the fact that Talenti’s sale occurred after the 
valuation date was through the exercise of judicial discretion, which would 
allow the court to adjust the value of the asset as necessary after the valuation 
date to achieve a just and equitable outcome.251  
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court erroneously relied on the 
provision in section 518.003 that states, “[E]ach spouse has a common 
ownership in marital property that vests not later than the time of the entry 
of the decree in a proceeding for dissolution.”252 While this is a worthy 
reference to one of the governing statutes, this provision of section 518.003 
does not help resolve the classification of the sales as either marital or 
nonmarital property. The court likely referenced this provision to show that 
property can be divided up until the day of dissolution. While this is true, 
the legislature’s intent for this 1982 amendment was to clarify that divisions 
of marital property are not taxable events, not to justify ignoring the 
valuation date.253 
                                                           
245 Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2019) (The Minnesota Supreme Court’s goal should be “to ascertain 
and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”). 
246 See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301–08. 
247 MINN. STAT. §§ 518.58, subdiv. 1, 518.003, subdiv. 3b(d); see also supra Section IV.B.2. 
248 See supra Section IV.D.1. 
249 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 304. 
250 Id. 
251 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019). 
252 Id. 
253 The Minnesota Supreme Court has distinguished the 1982 amendment, stating: 
The intent of the legislature in enacting this act is to confirm, clarify, and ratify 
legislative intent embodied in prior and existing state law, and state law as 
34
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 10
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss3/10
878 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:3 
Third, during the pendency of a dissolution proceeding, the governing 
law allows the court to preserve the parties’ marital assets through a court-
ordered sale of those marital assets and provide for the distribution of the 
funds received.254 The Minnesota Supreme Court erroneously inferred that 
proceeds from a consensual sale of marital property are no different than 
proceeds from a court-ordered sale of marital property.255 While the 
governing statute allows for a court-ordered sale of marital property, it is 
silent on the matter of a consensual sale of marital property.256 Regardless of 
the statute’s meaning, the court’s inference is flawed because the problem—
that Talenti’s proceeds were never marital property under the strictures of 
the law—remains. The proceeds were nonmarital property acquired after 
the valuation date.257 The only way the court could have incorporated the 
value of Talenti’s proceeds into the pre-sale valuation was by exercising its 
discretion and adjusting Talenti’s value when the value significantly 
increased shortly after the valuation date.258 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s creative, but faulty analysis, led to 
new precedent.259 Justice Anderson’s dissent rightly pointed out that the 
majority’s reasoning called for “considerable legal gymnastics,” which not 
only ignored the district court’s valuation date, but also rewrote the statutory 
                                                           
amended by this act, that the division or disposition of marital property caused 
by or incident to a decree of dissolution or annulment is not a sale, exchange, 
transfer, or disposition of or a dealing in property but is a division of a common 
ownership by spouses in property for purposes of the property laws of this state 
and for purposes of the United States and Minnesota income tax laws. 
Miller v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn. 1984) (quoting 1982 MINN. LAWS, ch. 464, § 
3). 
254 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 3(a). 
255 Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 303–04 (Minn. 2018) (“We see no reason to treat the 
proceeds of a consensual sale of marital property differently from the proceeds of a court-
ordered sale of marital property.”). 
256 See MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 3(a). If a statute is ambiguous, the court may ascertain 
the legislature’s intent by considering several matters, including the legislative history, the 
necessity for the law, and the consequences of various interpretations. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 
(2019). 
257 According to section 518.58, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes, “‘Nonmarital 
property’ means property real or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after 
the existence of their marriage, which . . . (d) is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.” 
Here, the proceeds from the sale of Talenti were acquired after the valuation date. Gill, 919 
N.W.2d at 301. 
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definition of marital property.260 The majority did not merely apply the 
existing statutes, it additionally “adopted a new hard and fast extra-textual 
rule—that all proceeds from the sale of marital property before dissolution 
constitute marital property as a matter of law—regardless of whether this 
produces an equitable result.”261 
3. Justifications for the Supreme Court’s Reasoning and Holding 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding did not fully comport with 
law, but it was just and equitable by allowing Gretchen to receive a 
proportionate share of the proceeds that she had only been denied because 
of strategic corporate timing.262 Three justifications provided by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court firmly supported its conclusion.263 
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that it did not need to 
defer to the district court’s purported findings of fact and could interpret the 
contract de novo as a question of law.264 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
subsequent interpretation conformed with the common usage of earn-out 
payments in business acquisitions.265 It is not unusual for a sale to use earn-
out payments as a way to defer payment, especially when the parties cannot 
come to an agreement on a fair purchase price.266 Additionally, earn-out 
payments are a way to bridge the gap between a company’s current value 
and its unrealized potential value and can provide incentives for key 
leadership to remain active in the company post sale.267 These common 
usages resonate with Gill, solidifying the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
                                                           
260 Id. at 308. Although Justice Anderson’s dissent rightly points out the flaws in the majorityʼs 
holding, its own analysis is flawed as well because it mimicked the district courtʼs analysis and 
would not produce a just and equitable division of property. 
261 Id. at 311. 
262 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment 
and Decree at 12, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 
8, 2016). 
263 See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301–08. 
264 Id. at 307 (citation omitted) (“We need not defer to the district courtʼs purported findings 
of fact because they are instead conclusions of law based on the district courtʼs interpretation 
of the purchase agreement.”). 
265 Id. at 300 (quoting the purchase agreement that stated, “As additional consideration for 
the Assets, the Company shall also be eligible to receive from Asset Buyer (i) an amount 
equal to the First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to the Second Earn-out 
Payment . . . .”). 
266 Kimberly S. Blanchard, The Tax Man Cometh: Handling Earn-outs in Business 
Acquisitions, 6 BUS. L. TODAY 59, 61 (1997). 
267 Id. at 60.  
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determination that the earn-out payments were not intended as 
compensation for Stephen’s future work.268  
Second, Stephen signed an employment agreement compensating him 
$738,125 to continue his employment at Talenti for two years.269 The 
amount was similar to the amount Stephen was already earning at Talenti—
approximately $350,000 annually.270 Stephen’s claim that the earn-out 
payments were compensation for his continued employment is illogical 
because he would receive an additional $5.6 million for two years of work 
in addition to his contracted compensation—a total compensation 
astronomically beyond anything he ever received working at Talenti before 
the sale.271 
Third, the purchase agreement specified that all members, including 
passive members, would receive a portion of the earn-out payments, 
regardless of any future work with the company.272 This provision directly 
contradicted Stephen’s claim that the earn-out payments were 
compensation for his future work.273 Moreover, it is not logical, fair, or just 
for Gretchen to be the only non-working member precluded from receiving 
a share of the earn-out payments.274 
Despite the justifications behind the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
holding, it was not enough to avoid creating new precedent. 
4. How the Supreme Court Could Have Achieved Its Desired 
Outcome Without Setting New Precedent  
Creating new precedent that usurped the legislature’s authority was 
unnecessary. Like the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court should have explicitly pointed out the district court’s abuse 
                                                           
268 See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 306. 
269 Id. at 300. 
270 Brief and Addendum for Respondent at 14, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. 
A16-1421), 2018 WL 2283065, at *40. 
271 Id. at 14. 
272 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 300 (quoting the purchase agreement language that stated, 
“[I]mmediately following the consummation of the Asset Purchase, [David Goliath] shall 
effect a distribution to the Members of (a) the Asset Purchase Payment and (b) the right to 
receive (i) an amount equal to the First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to 
the Second Earn-out Payment.”). 
273 Id. at 306 (relating Stephenʼs attempt to overcome the presumption that Gretchen is 
entitled to an equitable distribution of the earn-out payments by arguing that the earn-out 
payments are nonmarital property that he acquired “after the valuation date” as 
compensation for his post-marital labor). 
274 Id. at 300, 307. 
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of discretion for its failure to apply the governing law.275 Once the Minnesota 
Supreme Court established the district court’s abuse of discretion, the court 
should have applied all of the governing statutes and presented a clear 
analysis of the law’s pertinence to its holding.276 It should have exercised the 
judicial discretion afforded in the statute and considered all relevant 
factors:277 the pre-valuation knowledge of Talenti’s impending sale, the letter 
of intent detailing the sale’s economic agreement, the letter of intent’s 
consistency with the final purchase agreement, and the timing of the sale 
relative to the valuation and dissolution date.278 These relevant factors 
created the ideal case for using the afforded discretion to adjust the value of 
Talenti because the value had substantially changed between the date of 
valuation and the date of dissolution.279 As such, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court could have recognized the earn-out payments as part of the value of 
Talenti and adjusted Gretchen’s award after the valuation date as permitted 
by section 518.58.280  
Yet, the court ignored the language of the statute providing for judicial 
discretion to achieve a just and equitable result and instead focused solely 
on the classification of the earn-out payments while disregarding the 
valuation date.281 This created new precedent that was unnecessary.  
E. Potential Future Consequences 
In Minnesota, the law governing property distribution in a marriage 
dissolution was purposely crafted to eliminate gender bias and generate 
certainty through an established valuation date while still affording a high 
degree of judicial flexibility to render a just and equitable distribution.282 By 
setting the default valuation date at a prehearing conference, parties were 
protected from events both within and beyond their control.283 
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in an effort to fix the 
lower courts’ decisions and follow established standards of review, ignored 
the legislature’s purposeful balancing. By doing so, the supreme court 
                                                           
275 See supra Section IV.B.3. 
276 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 310 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no need to create a new 
timeframe for classifying proceeds where the district court already has discretion to change 
the valuation date if the court finds that ‘another date of valuation is fair and equitable.’”). 
277 See supra Section IV.C.2. 
278 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298. 
279 Id. at 311 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2018)). 
280 See MINN. STAT. § 518.58. 
281 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 304. 
282 See supra Part II. 
283 See Judkins, supra note 72 at 474–75 (“Early valuation . . . also delivers certainty for pre-
trial settlement negotiations based upon accurate financial data.”). 
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adopted an inflexible new rule: that all proceeds from the sale of marital 
property before dissolution constitute marital property as a matter of law.284 
While the supreme court decision may have solved one problem—that of 
fairly distributing earn-out payments to Gretchen Gill—it may have created 
others. 
One possible consequence is that Gill’s new hard and fast rule may 
affirmatively eliminate the judicial discretion necessary to fairly evaluate the 
unique circumstances and needs of each party. As the dissent points out: 
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, the district court has discretion 
to ‘adjust the valuation’ of a marital asset to reflect any ‘substantial change’ 
in the value of the asset after the valuation date in order ‘to effect an 
equitable distribution’ of the asset, as well as discretion to ‘make a just and 
equitable division of the marital property’ between the parties. Thus, the 
court is not ‘merely applying the existing statutes,’ as it contends; rather, the 
court is adopting a new hard and fast extra-textual rule—that all proceeds 
from the sale of marital property before dissolution constitute marital 
property as a matter of law—regardless of whether this produces an equitable 
result.”285 
For example, would the supreme court’s hard and fast rule be fair and 
equitable if Gretchen had consistently opposed and obstructed the sale of 
Talenti prior to her divorce? Likely not. Would the supreme court’s hard 
and fast rule be fair and equitable if a spouse purposely neglected or 
disdained a property prior to the valuation date, only to show sudden 
interest if the property is sold before the final dissolution for a significant 
increase in value due solely to the efforts of the other spouse? Again, likely 
not. Yet, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s new precedent could lead to these 
absurd outcomes if taken to its logical extreme, which outcome is often the 
result of denying the judge any substantial measure of discretion.286 
Moreover, Gill’s attempt at a strict rule to create certainty could actually 
create uncertainty. If marital property is distributed upon the valuation date 
but remains subject to potential redistribution if sold before final 
dissolution, certainty is diminished. An asset’s value has the potential to 
increase tremendously within that period.287 Yet, a party would be 
disincentivized from maximizing that potential for fear of redistribution. 
                                                           
284 Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298. 
285 Id. at 311 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
286 JOHN SASSOON, ANCIENT LAWS & MODERN PROBLEMS: THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
JUSTICE AND A LEGAL SYSTEM 203 (Intellect Books Reprint ed. 2005). 
287 Judkins, supra note 72, at 474 (“One must also caution practitioners about the effect of 
early valuation dates on increases in marital assets, like stock plans, securities, or business 
partnerships. Property value may rise . . . . ”). 
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This is exactly why the legislature provided judicial discretion—so that judges 
can use their common sense to obtain a just and equitable distribution in 
each individual circumstance.288 
An additional possible consequence is the re-introduction of gender 
and role-based disparities due to the elimination of judicial discretion. By 
not exercising its judicial discretion and, instead, focusing on whether 
property is marital or non-marital, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
undermined the strength of the court’s judicial discretion to maintain gender 
equality.  
For example, a potential byproduct of the homemaker’s sacrifice to 
stay home is a lack of in-depth knowledge regarding the working spouse’s 
business or career. This can spill over into divorce proceedings and result 
in an unfair and inequitable distribution of property. In Gill, Gretchen did 
not have a firm knowledge of Talenti’s worth, nor did she have a place at 
the negotiation table or a say in the sale’s timing.289 This put her at a 
disadvantage when the time came to value and distribute assets. Yet, there 
is no doubt that Gretchen’s role as a homemaker contributed invaluably to 
her husband’s business success and that she deserved an equitable portion 
of Talenti’s proceeds.290 Exercise of the court’s discretion was imperative to 
remedy this imbalance.  
 Although the new rule worked out favorably for Gretchen, in the 
future, Gill could facilitate planning to game the system and cheat the less 
knowledgeable spouse out of their fair share of assets. For example, earn-
out payments, which used to favor the seller, could be couched as 
compensation to avoid the consequences of division, which are likely to be 
greater than the additional tax penalties.291  
                                                           
288 Thomas A. Zonay, Judicial Discretion: Ten Guidelines for Its Use, THE NATIONAL 
JUDICIAL COLLEGE: THE JUDICIAL EDGE (MAY 25, 2015), https://www.judges.org/judicial-
discretion-ten-guidelines-for-its-use/ [https://perma.cc/3XR4-CQ4Z]. 
289 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment 
and Decree at 9–13, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Family Ct. Div., 
Apr. 8, 2016).  
290 The court conclusively presumes that each spouse made a substantial contribution to the 
acquisition of income and property while they were living together as husband and wife. 
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019). Nowhere in the court proceedings did Stephen 
refute this “conclusive presumption.”  
291 See Blanchard, supra note 266 (“An individual seller will ordinarily want to avoid having 
the earn-out be taxed as compensation . . . [because] she will be subject to federal income 
tax on ordinary income at rates up to 39.6 percent, whereas the maximum rate of tax on 
long-term capital gain is only 28 percent. In addition, compensation for services is subject to 
FICA or SECA taxes, including the 2.9 percent health insurance tax with no cap. The buyerʼs 
tax interest may be diametrically opposed to that of the seller. A buyer seeking to maximize 
its tax position will ordinarily prefer to have the earn-out treated as compensation for services, 
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 These potential consequences might have been avoided by a close 
reading and application of the governing statutes that provided ample 
flexibility and certainty to reach the same outcome—fairly awarding 
Gretchen Gill an equitable share of the earn-out payments from Talenti’s 
sale.  
F. Potential Statutory Revisions to Increase Clarity  
Going forward, the legislature may have to amend one of the last 
remaining vestiges of noncompulsory judicial discretion in the statutes 
governing property distribution in marriage dissolutions. Section 518.58, 
subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes currently reads, “If there is a 
substantial change in value of an asset between the date of valuation and the 
final distribution, the court may adjust the valuation of that asset as necessary 
to effect an equitable distribution.”292 Perhaps the “may” should become 
another “shall,” just as the rest of the statute reads. Though it would not 
really change the requirement to exercise discretion by considering all 
competing factors and adjusting an asset’s valuation as needed for a just and 
equitable result, it would eliminate confusion about what it means to 
exercise discretion.293  
Additionally, a more stringent and clear emphasis within subdivision 
3b of section 518.003, and section 518.58, to use both sections in tandem 
could prevent a similar outcome in the future.294 Had these changes been 
implemented, the outcome could have been different at each stage of the 
Gill litigation. The parties could have saved time and resources, and the 
court could have avoided setting new precedent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Over a span of fifty years, the Minnesota legislature carefully wrote 
and amended the statutes governing the division of marital property in a 
marriage dissolution to bring about a just and equitable division.295 In Gill, 
the judiciary brought about a regression by adopting a new rule that dictates 
all pre-dissolution proceeds from the sale of marital property—without 
regard to the valuation date—are marital property as a matter of law.296 
                                                           
because payment of compensation will usually generate a current tax deduction for the buyer. 
If the buyer is a corporation, the value of the tax deduction may be as high as 35 percent of 
the amount paid.”). 
292 MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019) (emphasis added). 
293 See State v. Grover, No. A16-1565, 2017 WL 3469449, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 
2017). 
294 See MINN. STAT. §§ 518.003, subdiv. 3b, 518.58.  
295 See supra Part II. 
296 Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 312 n.4 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
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 This new court-made rule is undesirable because it takes away the 
flexibility and certainty of the statute, while proliferating gender- and role-
based disparities. It is also unnecessary because it could have been avoided 
at each stage of litigation if the courts had carefully assessed and applied the 
appropriate standard of review and the governing statutes. One way to avoid 
future repercussions of the courts’ errors is through amendment of the 
statutes to require a court’s use of its discretion when evaluating a substantial 
change in an asset’s value and an increased emphasis to apply the statutes in 
tandem. 
 Luckily for Gretchen Gill, the court reached the right outcome, even 
if it relied on faulty reasoning to get there.297 
 
                                                           
297 See id. at 301–08. 
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